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Introduction
Lethal autonomous weapon systems, or LAWS, are weapons that can select a target with the help of sensors
and artificial intelligence and attack with little to no human intervention [1]. There are several economic,
political, and social benefits to LAWS, but also there are risks and costs. Currently, there are no laws regulating
these weapon systems, but most stakeholders are lobbying for a change in policy. This policy brief discusses
three different potential states of policies: (1) no new policies to regulate LAWs, (2) a complete ban of LAWs,
and (3) strict regulations regarding the use of LAWs. We recommend allowing the deployment of LAWS with
strict regulations around their use and a mandated amount of human control. 
The Grand Challenge
LAWS are weapons that require no human intervention to apply lethal force. This contrasts with human-
supervised autonomous weapons, which allow for a human to remotely intervene in the
weapon’s operation at all times. The U.S. military is currently using unarmed
autonomous systems, such as the Squad Mission Support System (SMSS), a 
vehicle designed to follow soldiers in the field while carrying supplies and
equipment [2]. The U.S. military has developed and tested armed
autonomous systems like the Have Raider, a “fully combat-capable
F-16” that can operate without human input [3]. However, no
LAWS are currently being used on the battlefield.
Current Policy
No international laws presently exist to regulate or
prohibit LAWS. The United States is not against the use of
LAWS but also does not currently own them. The U.S. might 
be compelled to develop them if their adversaries do so [4].
Russia has taken a more aggressive approach, stating that 
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research on LAWS is a top defense priority, for 
the advancement of science. On the other hand, 
172 countries and organizations have come 
together to form The Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots promoting a complete ban of “killer 
robots” [5]. 
Risks, Benefits and Ethics 
LAWS, in the best case, can win wars 
efficiently. However, the lack of human 
intervention can lead to an unwanted loss of 
civilian life [6]. The increasing complexity of 
LAWS makes it difficult to test these weapons in 
challenging scenarios. The risk of LAWS suffering 
bugs, system failures or getting hacked also 
increases this level of unpredictability, leading to 
more risk in their deployment. 
However, advancements in LAWS technology 
demonstrate that such systems can be much 
more precise and effective than humans. These 
systems can be designed to only fire once fired 
upon, helping reduce the risk of civilian 
casualties. LAWS also decrease financial costs of 
maintaining, training, or treating military 
personnel, allowing for a much cheaper 
alternative to soldiers. This approach leads to a 
reduction of the number of service members 
lost, making LAWS a viable, life-saving 
technology [7]. 
Even if LAWS can differentiate between 
targets, there still exists a significant ethical 
concern regarding the actual use of these 
systems. Even if LAWS are designed to follow a 
proper ethical code, such as properly 
distinguishing between civilians and 
combatants, the possibility for them being used 
improperly or unethically will continue to exist 
[8]. It is argued that the removal or partial 
removal of human decision making would lead to 
a “loss of dignity” for their human targets. In 
turn, this creates severe human rights concerns 
and unnecessary fear within civilian societies as 
there would no longer be humans making the 
decision to kill [9]. It is then argued that the best 
way to preserve humanity’s dignity would be to 
control the algorithms designed for LAWS to 
retain a human-in-the-chain to preserve this 
accountability and avoid any moral wrongdoing 
[10]. 
Costs 
The use and deployment of LAWS would 
inquire many economic, societal, psychological, 
and political costs. For economic costs, “global 
research spending on autonomous weapons and 
AI [artificial intelligence] is projected to reach 
$16 and $18 billion U.S. dollars respectively by 
the year 2025” [11], and autonomous weapons 
would need to be heavily regulated by an 
international body like the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), further adding to LAWS’ 
monetary cost. Societal costs of LAWS would 
include the loss of “human dignity” and 
dehumanization of warfare caused by relegating 
the decision to kill a human being to a robot, 
causing a loss of responsibility and moral 
accountability for lives lost [12]. Autonomous 
weapons, as seen by existing research on the 
psychological effects of drones, could also create 
a large psychological toll for civilians anticipating 
an attack. Finally, according to a survey done by 
Ipsos, sixty-one percent (61%) of people are 
completely opposed to autonomous weapons 
[13]. This opposition, in addition to the thirty 
(30) countries that oppose the use of 
autonomous weapons [14], suggests that 
developing LAWS could harm domestic political 
careers and foreign diplomatic relations of policy 
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Policy Alternatives and 
Recommendations 
One option is to allow LAWS to exist under 
current laws of warfare. This would allow 
militaries to reap the full benefits of deploying 
autonomous weapons. LAWS could be designed 
to avoid ethical issues by being designed to only 
fire when fired upon, and to only be deployed 
where civilian casualties are unlikely (such as 
underwater or in space) [7]. Accountability for 
mishaps would fall on those who chose to deploy 
the weapons while knowing (or while they 
should have known) their risks. However, this 
would not prevent states or non-state actors 
from designing or deploying LAWS unethically 
and would make it difficult to restrict unethical 
use of these weapons. 
There is also the option to completely prohibit 
autonomous weapons altogether, eliminating 
any risks that come with their use. Prohibition of 
autonomous weapons would also quell any 
ethical concerns around their use in warfare. 
However, the complete prohibition of 
autonomous weapons would have a large 
legislative toll, and it would take a large effort on 
both a national and global level to put 
prohibitions and treaties in place around the 
world. Along with this, any existing development 
and research on autonomous weapons would 
either need to be retooled or scrapped, creating 
additional monetary costs. 
Finding a balance in terms of the regulation of 
LAWS will allow for the best combination of 
military benefits and ensuring the technology is 
used ethically. Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law should be the basis of 
creating such policy regulations, and respect for 
human dignity can be preserved by retaining 
human control [15]. Policies that permit human 
operators to intervene in LAWS will allow for 
increased transparency in terms of 
accountability when a user or party needs to be 
identified. This brief recommends this balanced 
approach, proposing that international 
regulation requiring human supervision for 
autonomous weapons be created and enforced. 
Without any major agreements, it will be 
difficult to ensure the risks and dangers of 
autonomous weapons are mitigated. There are 
several directions the policies can go. The first 
option would be to let the current state of policy 
remain and trust the developers of LAWS to use 
them ethically. Another option would be to 
completely ban their development and 
deployment. The final option, that we 
recommend, would be to enforce strict 
regulations on the use of LAWS to prevent 
unethical use and also to prevent the toll of 
enforcing a complete ban. 
References 
[1] R. Surber, “Artificial Intelligence: Autonomous 
Technology (AT), Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems (LAWS) and Peace Time Threats,” ICT for 
Peace Foundation, 21-Feb-2018. [Online]. 
Available: https://ict4peace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/2018_RSurber_AI-AT-
LAWS-Peace- Time-Threats_final.pdf. [Accessed: 
May 2, 2021]. 
[2] M. Roth, “Autonomous Vehicles in the Military 
– Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE 




systems/. [Accessed: May 2, 2021]. 
[3] “U.S. Air Force, Lockheed Martin Demonstrate 






    
    
    
  






Purdue Polley Research Institute I purdue.edu/dp/pprl 
4 
S-Air-Force-Lockheed-Martin-Demonstrate-
Manned-Unmanned-Teaming. [Accessed: May 2, 
2021]. 
[4] Congressional Research Service, “Defense 
Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapon Systems,” Congressional Research 
Service, Dec-2020. [Online]. Available: 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11150.pdf. 
[Accessed: 04-May-2021]. 
[5] The Campaign To Stop Killer Robots, “The 
Campaign To Stop Killer Robots,” About Campaign 
To Stop Killer Robots, 2012. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/about/. 
[Accessed: 04-May-2021]. 
[6] P. Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and 




[7] C. P. Toscano. “‘Friends of Humans’: An 
Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons 
Systems,” Journal of National Security Law & 
Policy, 2015. [Online]. Available: 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=jour 
nals&handle=hein.journals/jnatselp8&id=194&me 
n_tab=srchresults. [Accessed: May 2, 2021]. 
[8] A. Leveringhaus, "Ethics and Autonomous 
Weapons," 2016. Available: 
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/978-1-
137-52361-7. [Accessed: May 2, 2021]. 
[9] Á. Agreda, "Ethics of autonomous weapons 
systems and its applicability to any AI systems," 
ScienceDirect, 2021. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii 
/S0308596120300458. [Accessed: May 2, 2021]. 
[10] K. Anderson and M. Waxman, "Law and Ethics 
for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban 
Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can," 




p. [Accessed: May 2, 2021]. 
[11] D. Garcia and J. Haner, “The Artificial 
Intelligence Arms Race: Trends and World Leaders 
in Autonomous Weapons Development,” Global 
Policy. 10(3), 331-337. [Online]. Available: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ 
1758-5899.12713. [Accessed: May 04, 2021]. 
[12] International Committee of the Red Cross, 
“Autonomous Weapons Systems Technical, 
Military, Legal, and Humanitarian Aspects,” 01-
Nov-2014. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-
meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-
march-2014. [Accessed: May 4, 2021]. 
[13] C. Deeney, “Six in Ten (61%) Respondents 
Across 26 Countries Oppose the Use of Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Ipsos, 22-Jan-




[Accessed: May 4, 2021]. 
[14] The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Country 
Views on Killer Robots,” 11-Mar-2020. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/KRC_CountryViews_11 
Mar2020.pdf. [Accessed: May 4, 2021] 
[15] A. Dahlmann, “Preventive Regulation of 
Autonomous Weapon Systems,” SWP, 2019. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP03/#hd-







Purdue Polley Research Institute I purdue.edu/dp/pprl 
